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JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING AND PUBLIC OPINION
IN THE WARREN AND BURGER COURTS

Nancy L. Siemion, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1993
For many scholars, the Warren Court is the epitome o f antimajoritarian policy
making since many of the Court's decisions overturned legislation passed by
Representatives of the people. By examining nationwide public opinion polls in that
era that ask the public their thoughts about particular issues the Warren Court has
ruled on, it is evident that most o f these rulings were truly majoritarian and received
public approval. In addition, this thesis analyzes some recent studies that discern
national attitudes with respect to government policy making (public mood), assessing
congruity or incongruity between the Court's liberalism and public policy mood which
provides insight about the Warren Court's role perception. The Burger Court is
analyzed with similar methods to provide contrasts and comparisons with the Warren
Court. Finally, a normative study concerning the influence of public opinion is
undertaken to better understand the role o f the Supreme Court in American society.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Review o f Literature
Since the beginning o f American Constitutional thought, there has been a
common debate concerning judicial independence and the provisions to foster that
independence. Much o f the deliberation in Alexander Hamilton's day, focused on
such provisions as life tenured justices, and the most controversial, judicial review.
Hamilton, in Federalist #78, notes life tenure as necessary for proper judicial
deliberation without the interference of political factors, while judicial review was
deemed essential for constitutional supremacy. Still, many o f today's scholars, such as
Alexander Bickel, argue that these provisions for judicial independence were
institutionalized at the expense o f representative democracy, and lead to decisions that
thwart the will of the majority. Reviewing these acclamations and criticisms, from
Hamilton to Bickel and others, the Supreme Court's position in a representative
democracy remains that o f an institution unique in procedure and function.
Hamilton adamantly supported the need for life tenured justices, whose
position remained constant given their "good behavior" (1961, 522). Like Madison,
Hamilton feared the acts o f a representative body driven by majoritarian passions. He
spoke of life tenure o f Justices as an "excellent barrier to the encroachments and
oppressions of the representative body" (Hamilton 1961, 522). Further, he remarked
that this stable position isolates the Court sufficiently enough to keep them from being
"overpowered, awed, and influenced" by representatives (Hamilton 1961, 523). It is

1
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precisely for these reasons that Hamilton felt that the Court should lead in the realm of
Constitutional interpretation.
Judicial review, the Supreme Court's power to invalidate those laws and
policies that contradict the Constitution, is arguably a necessary function o f the Court
in order to preserve the supremacy o f the Constitution. Hamilton wrote, "whenever a
particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty o f the judicial
tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the former" (1961, 526). Hamilton even
suggested that the Court is not only the final interpreter o f those laws deemed
(un)constitutional, but that, in addition to this oversight function, a life tenured Court
would act as a bulwark against ill social policy: "But it is not with a view to infractions
of the Constitution only, that the independence o f the judges may be an essential
safeguard against the effects o f occasional ill humors in the society" (1961, 528).
Hamilton's views have not settled the debate over judicial review for he did not
seem concerned with whether o f not the procedures o f the Court were perceived as
democratic, as long as the Court provided a sufficient check against the legislature.
Scholars today continue the onslaught of criticism concerning the seemingly
undemocratic nature o f judicial review and the decisions that result. Probably the most
outspoken is Alexander Bickel.
Throughout his years o f scholarship Alexander Bickel has remained a staunch
believer that judicial review is the process that defines the Court as remote from the
democratic system given the fact that this review allows Justices to overturn laws
enacted by Representatives: "The root difficulty is that judicial review is a countermajoritarian force in our system" (Bickel 1986, 16). Further, he not only stresses that
the process is undemocratic, but also that the outcome (i.e. the Court decision) is antimajoritarian; "..when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or
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the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will o f the representatives o f the
actual people o f the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf o f the prevailing
majority, but against it" (Bickel 1986, 17). In essence, Bickel argues for popular
government with representation directed by the people in the representative's
deliberative functions; "We have, and ought to have, majoritarian government in the
sense that an essentially numerical majority has, and knows it has, the reserve power to
discredit decision makers, putting in others who will in future resist what has
displeased it" (Bickel 1955, 184). Obviously, a life tenured Court comprised of nine
individuals with ultimate power to determine the constitutionality o f law overrides this
concept o f representative democracy. Alexander Bickel does not stand alone in his
views.
Jesse Choper in Judicial Review and the National Political Process, also
focuses on the anomaly between representative democracy and the provisions meant to
foster judicial independence. He explains that the procedures o f appointment and
removal o f Justices preclude the democratic nature o f representative government.
"Federal judges not only are appointed rather than elected but they are removable only
by exceedingly intricate and extra-majoritarian process o f impeachment" (Choper
1980, 5). Although he acknowledges the "broad boundaries o f democratic
government" that appointment and removal procedures stay within (Choper 1980, 6),
Choper wholly denounces judicial review as undemocratic;
But when they exercise the power o f judicial review to declare unconstitutional
legislative, executive, or administrative action-federal, state, or local- they
reject the product o f popular will by denying policies formulated by the
majorities elected representatives... Not merely anti-majoritarian, judicial
review appears to cut directly against the grain o f traditional democratic
philosophy (Choper 1980, 6).
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In the book, Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren Court, Philip Kurland
expresses his firm convictions concerning the Court and its procedures: "There are few
strong beliefs that I have about the Supreme Court. The first is that the Court is not a
democratic institution, either in makeup or function" (Kurland 1970, 204). Kurland
attacks the function o f judicial review not only because it allows the Court to be the
ultimate decision maker with respect to constitutionality, but also because this review
sometimes results in minority, not majority rule (1980, 204).
In light o f these discussions, it becomes apparent that the Court has been
classified as undemocratic in both the formal/procedural and functional areas. The
formal realm reveals a Court whose procedure o f judicial review is highly questionable
in light o f representative democracy. The fact that five justices can determine the
constitutionality o f laws initiated at any local, state, federal level without any executive
or legislative check runs counter to most concepts o f democracy. Although many of
the authors above also point to the appointment and life-tenured positions o f justices
as undemocratic procedures, many have qualified their statements noting that
appointments are based on senate (representative ) approval and that impeachment
procedures are possible.
In many scholarly discussions, the primary function o f the Court has also been
labeled as undemocratic. This function o f the Court, derived from its procedure of
Judicial review, is to form decisions about cases based on Constitutional text and
precedent. These functional decisions, an outcome of judicial review procedures, have
been studied in an empirical fashion in recent decades. Some o f these studies,
particularly Robert Dahl's (1957) and Thomas Marshall's (1989), support an
uncommon view that the decisions o f the Court tend to reflect law-making majority or
public opinion o f the times, thus revealing an institution that is reflective o f popular
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opinion. If this be the case, the natural assumption that the decisions o f the Court
must surely be antimajoritarian given the Court's undemocratic procedures deserves
re-examination.
Throughout history there has been an ipso facto assumption made on the part
o f many scholars that since judicial review was an undemocratic procedure that
decisions resulting from this review are necessarily antimajoritarian with respect to the
people of this land. This logic assumes that all laws supported by a majority of
lawmakers (representatives) are also supported by a majority o f the people they
represent. Although this may be a reasonable hypothesis, is it a correct one? Some
past and recent empirical analysis challenges this assumption.
Robert Dahl, in his article "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme
Court as National Policy-Maker" (1957), attempted to determine whether or not
decisions handed down by the Court were truly pro-minority, thus antimajoritarian.
During Dahl's time, accurate nation-wide public opinion polls whose content
correlated with recent Supreme Court decisions where not available. Hence, the most
direct route for him to find out if the majority o f the nation agreed with the Court's
decisions was an unattainable project. To over come this obstacle he needed to study
this topic in an indirect fashion. Dahl assumed that since representatives are chosen by
the people that their laws and policies would reflect the national majority. He calls
these representatives the "law-making majority." This law-making majority is used as
a substitution, a representation, o f public opinion. Dahl concludes that if decisions o f
the Supreme Court reflect the will o f the legislative branch, the Court could be deemed
substantively "democratic."
Dahl's research led him to conclude that "the policy views dominant on the
Court are never for long out o f line with policy views dominant among the lawmaking
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majorities o f the United States" (1957, 285). Essentially, though not in every case, the
Court upholds rather than repudiates policy decisions o f the legislative bodies. Thus,
the institution that was set in motion to be the great defender o f minority rights proved
to be more a legitimator o f majority will. Also, as I will discuss later, this study raises
questions concerning the relationship between the Court, the legislature, and public
opinion. Mainly, the Court appears to be following some principle o f deference to the
legislature (indirectly to the public) and possibly to a broad sense o f what the public
wants (i.e. liberal or conservative decisions). Despite these questions, the conclusion
of Dahl's study firmly established that the Court's decisions resulting from judicial
review in the realm o f majoritarian representation.
Subsequent critical and empirical study has resulted from Dahl's original
research in 1957. John Casper o f Stanford University points out some inadequacies in
Dahl's study. First, Dahl's study did not include the entirety o f the Warren Court
period, a period traditionally thought o f as antimajoritarian. Second, the 1957 study
also did not include actions o f judicial review over state legislators. Casper, o f course,
extended Dahl's study to include cases from 1958-1974, and cases arising from the
states, and suggests that the Court is not as majoritarian as Dahl's study reports; "But
examination o f the state and local cases does reveal that the arena in which the Court
makes policy is substantially broader then the limited area Dahl selects for discussion.
Moreover, it suggests that the Court can and does get its way a good deal more
frequently than his [Dahl's] analysis implies" (Casper 1976, 59).
Conflict between the Court and the lawmaking majority has also been the basis
o f a 1973 study by David Adamany. Adamany's primary focus involved the realigning
period o f parties. This method uncovered deep conflicts between the Court and the
lawmaking majority following each realignment election. This finding led Adamany to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

conclude that the Court does not seek to legitimize the policies subsequent to
historical realignment periods (1973, 843). A similar study by Richard Funston, "The
Supreme Court and Critical Elections," analyzed realigning periods to find that the
overturning o f recently enacted laws was three times more frequent during realignment
(1975, 809).
Despite the conclusions that suggest the Court is more antimajoritarian than
not, Bradley Canon and Sidney Ulmer (1976) examine the question further. Canon
and Ulmer point out some methodological errors in Funston's study and sought to
correct them. Redefining the historical realignment periods, Canon and Ulmer argue
that the Court remains as much a majoritarian force in transitional periods as in nontransitional eras. This final analysis of realignment periods continues to stress the
majoritarian emphasis o f the Court's decisions. Yet, these previous studies lack a
direct methodological analysis that truly focuses in on judicial decisions and popular
opinion.
As Robert Dahl first suggested back in 1957, the most direct route to defining
whether or not the Court tends to be majoritarian or not, is to correlate nationwide
public opinion polls with Supreme Court decisions. Simply, the question is: Does the
court reflect popular opinion or, more specifically, does popular opinion influence the
Courts? These previous studies have not utilized this direct route, but there has been
some more recent analysis o f specific Court cases and corresponding public opinion.
Although these studies are an essential part to understanding the Court's relationship
to public opinion, they also exemplify the many difficulties with public opinion
analysis.
David Bamum (1985) in "The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial
Decision Making in the Post-New Deal Period" identified eleven policy areas and
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correlates the rulings to trends in public opinion polls. Barnum finds that on many
issues including birth control, school segregation, interracial marriage, and abortion,
the Court, over the long run, reflects public opinion trends (1985, 663). Yet, without
multivariate analysis, Bamum's study (as well as others) does not address the
possibility o f intervening variables. As is probably the case, other sources may also be
affecting the Court's decisions.
Another specific policy study by Judith Blake, Erik Uslanner, and Ronald
Weber sites abortion rulings as reflective o f an exaggeration of support for abortion,
despite an upward momentum in trend line data. Although they admit that there were
dramatic increases in support o f abortion (froml8% to 46%), the subsequent polls find
opinion leveling at less than 50% (1980, 220). This, they entertain, is not a mandate
for unrestricted abortion laws. Once again, the prospect o f intervening variables that
might impact the outcome o f the Court's decision on abortion may have shown other
causal factors. Here, it is assumed that the Court differed directly to majority-public
opinion (or at least what was perceived as the majority).
In 1983, Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro analyze the relationship between
public policy and public opinion. With reference to a number o f varying policies they
look for a congruence between policies and opinion. In this study they find that
among social, economic, and welfare issues, the greatest congruence is with social
issues. And, even though the Court is not a duly elected body, there is "little
difference between the executive, Congress, and the federal courts" with respect to
overall levels o f congruity between policy and opinion. One question that plagues this
analysis is: What is congruence? Page and Shapiro may only wish to suggest a
similarity between opinion and policy, yet often we must be in tune with the factors
that brought about this congruence in order that we fully understand the model posed.
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One factor not presented in many o f the above studies is the difficulty in
measuring the concept o f public opinion. Since many o f the above analysts did not
include multivariate analysis in their studies, it becomes difficult to say what public
opinion is. Often, it is not just the majority answer o f "agree" o f "disagree" in relation
to a particular issue, but an aggregation o f varying levels o f agreement on multiple
indicators o f public attitude over a period o f time. As James Stimson points out in his
book, Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles and Swings, "Where one presumes
that public opinion is no more than the answers to opinion, belief, and preference
questions in surveys, ...then no further substantive model is required. But this
approach can't yield a set of rules for how we might measure a concept. It simply tells
us that the measure is the measure" (1991, 18).
In addition to the difficulties represented above, there is often the question o f
"the chicken and the egg;" does public opinion influence the Court or does the Court
influence the opinion? My study addresses the former, but some scholars have
grappled with the latter. A 1987 study by Page, Shapiro, and Dempsy concluded that
the Court has a notable impact on public opinion, yet negatively. They remark that
many o f the controversial issues o f the 1970's and 1980's were contradictory to
popular opinion. This analysis was o f limited sample size which, on an inferential
basis, lends it open to criticism. In fact, limited sample size is another common barrier
to many studies o f this nature signifying the need for a comprehensive analysis which
includes a wide span o f Court history which increases sample size, incorporates a wide
range of causal models, and is methodologically sophisticated. Thomas Marshall's
1989 study does this.
Marshall compiles an index that matches Supreme Court cases with public
opinion poll data that correspond to the case content. Essentially, if Gallup, NORC,
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and other polling agencies ask specific questions that tap into the issue o f a Supreme
Court case, then this is considered a match. For example, Roe vs. Wade is possibly
matched with a February 1973 Gallup Poll that asks: "Would you favor or oppose a
law which would permit a woman to go to a doctor to end pregnancy at any time
during the first three months?"
From these matches he analyses how majoritarian behavior varies over time,
between types o f cases, between individual Justices, and develops models to test
several common hypotheses. Although his research takes into account the normative
arguments surrounding the Court and judicial review, his is primarily an empirical
approach. In addition to his empirical analysis outlined above, Marshall also
researches twelve possible linkages between mass public opinion and Court decisions,
and he discusses major theories that the modern court has developed to explain what
role public opinion should play injudicial policy making. In Marshall's final analysis he
concludes "that over three-fifths o f the modem Court's decisions reflect public opinion
majorities or pluralities. While precise comparison's are difficult to make, the modem
Court appears to be as majoritarian as other American policy makers" (1989, 7).
Hence, the assumption that the legislature is more characteristic of the populous, than
the Supreme Court, by virtue o f its obvious representative nature (i.e. elections) can
not be granted automatically.

Empirical Design
Marshall's research will provide the foundation for my thesis. Based on
Marshall's design o f matching Supreme Court decisions with public opinion poll
results, I am choosing to use his index as a sampling frame for my research (1989,
194-201). Since public opinion polls generally typify issues of interest to the nation,
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these cases exemplify those o f the last six decades that are most salient. Marshall's
time frame o f cases extended from 1935-1986. Although this study is comprehensive,
I wish to alter the focus for purposes o f my research.
Throughout my personal review o f literature, many scholars including
Alexander Bickel (1955), Jesse Choper (1980), Philip Kurland (1970), and Robert
Carp (1990) have criticized or mentioned the criticism concerning the liberalism o f the
Warren Court. Many perceive this criticism as an indication that this Court was
especially anti-majoritarian in its final decisions. I am simply asking, was this the case?
By using Marshall's index and all the Warren Court cases matched with poll results
contained in this index (numbering 22), I will follow Marshall's coding procedures in
order to classify the Court decisions as majoritarian, anti-majoritarian, or unclear
(1989, 75-77). If the decision agreed with the poll majority then this is a majoritarian
decision, if not, the decision is antimajoritarian. Based on the determined frequency
distribution and percentages associated with the distribution I will be able to answer
whether the Court has represented majority will at least most o f the time. O f course, a
percent o f Court decisions that reflect public opinion must surpass a random-choice
base level o f 50% when unclear majorities are removed. Finally, if the Warren Court
has decided a majority o f decisions in congruence with majority-public opinion, then
the assertion that the Court function o f judicial review necessarily promotes anti
majoritarian decisions will be brought into question.
As I referred to in the review o f literature, it must be remembered that public
opinion as an independent variable is not a direct causal link that predicts 100% o f the
variance in Court decision making. Many other factors such as political socialization,
realigning events, or state policies may also be factors in the equation. Also, my
operationalization o f majority-public opinion through poll data is not the same as
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measuring the whole o f public opinion since there are often varying levels o f
agreement and a number o f intervening variables that together comprise what public
opinion may be at any one time with reference to any one issue.
Secondly, I think it will be important to contrast a liberal Court with the results
obtained from study o f a Court widely classified as conservative- the Burger Court.
Since Marshall provides 75 matches (starting in 1969) o f Burger Court decisions with
existing poll content, I will draw a random sample from the cases in the Burger time
frame o f 1975-1986. A sample o f 30 cases will be drawn from this lot o f 49. I have
chosen to delete the cases from 1969 to 1974, since it was not until 1975 when the
Burger Court forms its conservative majority. This will not only sharpen the
ideological differences between the two eras, but also enhance my comparative view.
Within this comparative mode, I would like to assess several factors. The first
relates to public opinion on a broader level than examined above. Essentially, I am
asking: What was the national trend o f attitudes o f the eras before and during the
Warren and Burger Courts. By locating trend data (i.e. Tom W. Smith, 1989) that
relate to this variable (attitude), an analysis could provide ample insight concerning the
context in which decisions were handed down. Did people in the nation reveal more
liberal attitudes in the 1960's than in the middle 70's to mid-80's? History tells us this
is so, but could it be that national attitude is a predictor o f how a Court perceives its
role in policy making? If in fact the nation is calling for more liberal or conservative
policies is it possible that the Court is deferring to this national attitude or mood? If it
is found that there are upward trends o f liberal attitudes in the nation that coincide
with the Warren Court era, and downward trends in liberalism during the Burger era,
this thought may have some salience.
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As I mentioned before, there may be some deference to public opinion via
national attitudes( direct perception) and/or legislative will (indirect perception).
Legislators are commonly known as representatives o f the people, and are often
assumed to be in touch with "the pulse o f the nation." Therefore, it has been widely
believed that if a legislative action is overturned by the Court that the decision is
forthwith anti-majoritarian. Hence, the Court may at times chose to restrain itself in a
particular decision (uphold the law) so as not to bring criticism upon itself. While
addressing this factor (i.e. overturning or upholding laws) in a comparative mode I ask
whether the Burger and Warren Court's differed in this respect.
Even though I have separated deference to national attitude and deference to
the legislature (representatives), the results could be one in the same or dramatically
different. For example, a Court decision to defer to the legislature could coincide with
both the legislative will and public opinion, or a decision o f this nature could agree
with the representatives yet not the populous. If the last scenario occurred frequently,
then the focus o f antimajoritarian behavior may need to shift to the legislature. Even
so, a finding o f this nature would further weaken the notion that lawmaking majorities
are always indicators o f popular opinion. Still, I will compare the Warren and Burger
Court's in these aspects to enhance this thesis.
One last aspect will be considered in relation to both the Warren Court and the
Burger Court. Who is activist and who is restraintist? The Warren Court is often
classified as "activist" since they often reversed many lower court decisions. On the
other hand, the Burger Court often chose to affirm lower court decisions, or defer to
the lower court by the denial o f certiorari, and was therefore deemed "restraintist".
This procedure o f classification does not address the issue of public opinion. For if a
decision is allowed to stand in the lower court, but a majority of the public do not
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agree with it, is this really a restrained decision? I say no. Likewise, a decision that is
a reversal o f the lower court, yet popular with the majority of Americans is not
activist. I would like to borrow Thomas Marshall's approach for determining activist
vs. restraintist judiciaries. The identification will follow as such: if a law is overturned

or upheld but it conflicts with majority-public opinion, it classified as activist.
Likewise, if a law is upheld or overturned but is in agreement with majority-public
opinion then it will be classified as restraintist. Here, the emphasis is not on whether
or not a reversal occurred, but on how the public identifies with the decision. This, I
believe, is a more accurate operation for determining the classification o f these Court
eras.
In conclusion, there may be a need for today's scholars to rethink the stance
that the Court is an undemocratic institution in the function o f decision making. To
recapitulate, the Court's procedure o f judicial review is arguably undemocratic, but
does this lend credence to the thought that the Court's decisions resulting from judicial
review are thus antimajoritarian? This is a question that Thomas Marshall has
convincingly answered "no." By redefining the terms "activist" and "restraintist,"
many Court cases can no longer be perceived of as undemocratic since a majority of
the people where agreeable to these decisions. Still, the recent debate concerning the
undemocratic decision making o f the Court has focused in on the differences in the
Warren and Burger eras. Many have denounced the Warren Court as "left wing
liberalism" that is continually out o f touch with mainstream American values and
opinion, and given the Burger Court the benefit o f a doubt due to its "temperate"
positions. With this study I will examine both the Warren and Burger Courts
relationships to public opinion and asses if these many associations are justified.
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CHAPTER II

THE WARREN ERA AND PUBLIC OPINION:
REDEFINING THE ACTIVIST COURT
In the previous discussion, many questions were asked about the Warren Court
with respect to its role in majoritarian/antimajoritarian decision making. Basically, the
view o f many scholars remains that the Warren era was one that sought to change
social attitudes and responses though discretionary decision making. Also, it is argued
that the Warren Court sought to "force" policy objectives, concerning desegregation,
school prayer, and criminal rights (just to name a few), that they personally preferred
without adequate consideration o f state's rights and/or public disposition. In the view
o f many Warren Court critics, this was done by over-extending constitutional
provisions in order to address the day's social concerns not explicitly dealt with in the
Constitution. All of this, identifies a Court which gives minimal regard to popular
opinion and shows little deference to lower court interpretation. An excerpt from

Politics and the Warren Court lists proposed efforts by Congressional quibblers to
reverse the Warren Courts actions:
an ample and continuing series of proposals to reverse not only the
desegregation cases but all other racial decisions, and leave the states entirely
to their own devices in regulating the relations between races; and finally, an
equally ample and continuing series o f draft amendments that would make
structural changes in the Court, such as requiring unanimity before a state
statute can be declared unconstitutional (Bickel 1955, 149).
Probably the most renown and frequent dissenter o f the Warren Court,
Alexander Bickel, vents his opposition as such:

15
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It follows inexorably that the 'radical' justices who are engaged in 'amend-ing'
the Constitution are simply a body of electorally irresponsible politicians, and
that there can be no excuse for letting them exercise a veto over the actions of
other politicians, who are responsible to the voters (Bickel 1986, 78).
The problem with these criticisms is that most have relied upon visceral notions
o f how the Warren Court decisions, or even Court decisions in general, are received
by the people o f this country. Without utilization o f any objective measures o f public
opinion, the Warren Court was characterized as undemocratic. So what makes an
institution democratic? I would suggest that the overall concern for any democratic
institution is that it, more than not, expresses the will o f the people in its decision
making. So the Court, although not a puppet of public sentiment, should assess a
good number o f its final decisions with regard not only to constitutional principles, but
also generally shared values and ideals in the society. The abortion debate is a prime
example o f the Court's reflection o f nationwide attitudes, even when these attitudes are
conflicting or ambiguous. Today, much o f the country remains variable about the
morality o f abortion and the extent o f circumstances under which it shall be allowed.
The Court's decisions over the last ten years reflects this uncertainty with decisions
that have limited a women's rights to an unconditional abortion, while refraining from
completely banning abortion.
This research attempts to answer questions, with empirical support, concerning
whether or not the criticisms mentioned above are sound and justified. Prior to
answering such questions, it important to emphasize and introduce my definitions o f an
"activist11versus a "restraintist" Court decision. The following definitions for each role
orientation (label) are quite different from those of critics such as B ickel.
For many critics, activist court decisions are labeled as such because the Court
has overturned a previous lower court judgment or legislative decree. The theory
behind this classification is such that lower courts and elected legislative bodies are far
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more "in touch" with the values and ideals o f "their" people than a high court located
in Washington and isolated from the masses. Representatives and local courts, by their
nature and proximity, have a greater understanding o f the cases as they relate to the
people. Since this is believed to be the situation, the high court should show deference
to lower court decisions only with exception to those cases that pose obvious
constitutional threats. Even when this occurs, the Supreme Court should refrain from
"reaching" outside the bounds o f issues the Constitution addresses. In light o f these
thoughts, a decision that has reversed the lower court ruling, or succumb to any
interpretation other than literal Constitutional premises is deemed "activist".
Definition in these terms is often disassociated with the majoritarian focus I
have proposed (i.e. Thomas Marshall 1989). We are seeking to address the question
o f whether or not a particular decision or group o f decisions in a particular era can be
classified as activist. The main criterion should not simply be whether or not a lower
court decision was reversed by the Supreme Court, but rather, what is the relationship
o f the Supreme Court ruling to popular opinion? Public opinion polls, Gallup and
Harris, whose wording is similar to specific Court decisions or directly asked about the
decision, will account for the measuring o f nationwide opinion with respect to that
specific ruling. This is the criteria that is applied to a specific Court case and poll to
produce a "match." The frequency distribution in the poll will determine the majoritypublic opinion (i.e. the highest percentage), and the majority's relationship to the
Supreme Court ruling will allow for a classification as activist, or restraintist. Simply,
the poll states the plurality which is then compared to the decision to determine
whether or not the decision is congruous or incongruous to the majority's opinion. In
some cases the classification is indeterminable due to the close frequency distribution
(e.g. favor-49%, oppose-51%). From this point, it is asked: Did the majority of
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people agree or disagree with the decision o f the Supreme Court? If they agree, the
ruling is not activist-- even if the Supreme Court ruling was a reversal o f the lower

Court or legislative judgment— since the majority o f the public are favorable to that
Supreme Court ruling.
Similar majoritarian criteria are used to classify decisions as restraintist. If a
decision o f the high court simply upholds a lower court decision, but leaves a vast
majority o f Americans outraged, is this truly restraintist?—not by my stated criteria.
The ruling and its relationship with the people should the primary concern here. A
restraintist decision would be classified as such if, and only if, the decision was
agreeable to a majority o f Americans, just as a decision that is not agreeable to a
majority must be classified as activist. I believe these altered criteria for identifying
particular Court periods as activist or restraintist are important to fully understanding
the Court's rulings and their relationship to the people. Again, I agree that some of
the Court's procedures (i.e. life tenured justices and judicial review) are undemocratic,
but does this confine the Court to rulings that do not reflect a democracy's will? I do
not believe this is the case.
In light o f the criticisms surrounding the Court under Chief Justice Earl
Warren, the main question remains: Was this an activist (i.e. antimajoritarian) Court in
which a majority o f rulings were without a plurality o f public support? My analysis
includes 21 cases from the original 22 (one had to be dropped for lack o f poll data).
Table 1 delineates the data outlined by year o f the Court decision, name o f case,
whether I have the case classified as: restraintist(R), activist(A), or not
determinable(ND); percent agreeing with decision, and percent disagreeing with
decision. Prior to reviewing this data, some explanations need to be made. First, the
categories indicating percentage o f agreement and disagreement with decision, in most
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Table 1
Warren Court Case List with Frequecy Distributions

Year Supreme Court Case

1) 1954 Brown v. Board I-R

% Agree w/decision
o f Court

% Disagree w/decision
o f Court

54%

41%

1955 Brown v. Board II-R

54%

39%

3) 1958 Cooper v. Aaron-ND

46%

44%

4) 1960 Boynton v. Virginia-R

66%

28%

5) 1963 Gideon v. Wainwright-A

24%

46%

6) 1963 Abingtonv. Schempp-A

24%

70%

7) 1963 AFSCME v. Muskeg.-R

50%

38%

8) 1964 Ht. Atl. Mot. v. U.S.-R

61%

31%

9) 1964 Reynolds v. Sims-R

47%

30%

10) 1966 S. Carol, v. Katzenb.-R

76%

16%

11) 1966Schmer. v. Califom.-R

84%

12%

12) 1966 Glaser v. Califomia-R

84%

12%

13) 1967 Loving v. Virginia-ND

48%

46%

14) 1968 Jones v. Mayer-A

35%

54%

15) 1968 Ferrell v. Dallas ISD-R

80%

17%

16) 1968 Green v. New Kent -A

21%

72%

17) 1969 Powell v. McCorm.-A

20%

63%

2)
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Table 1-Continued

Year Supreme Court Case

% Agree w/decision
o f Court

% Disagree w/decision
o f Court

18) 1969 Shapiro v. Thomps.-A

30%

58%

19) 1969 Alexander v. Holmes -A

38%

48%

20) 1969 Oatis v. Nelson-R

86%

14%

21) 1969Chimel v. Califomia-ND

48%

46%

cases, are not the exact response categories asked for by the polling agency. For
example, the poll used to measure public opinion concerning the some issues in the
Gideon vs. Wainwright case reads as follows:
The Supreme Court has ruled that as soon as the police arrest a suspect, he
must be warned o f his right to remain silent and to have a lawyer. Only if he
voluntarily waives these rights may the police question him. If he wants a
lawyer, but cannot afford one, the state must pay the fee. The lawyer has the
right to be present during the questioning and advise the suspect to say
nothing. The following question was asked o f those who said they followed
the issue: Do you think the Supreme Court's ruling on confession was good or
bad? (Gallup 1966, 7/8-13/66)
Here, the question pertains to whether the decision was "good" or "bad." In
order to uniformly classify the data from the responses I must translate the percent
who said this was "good" into, that they agreed with the decision. Essentially, the
response category that indicates affirmation o f the Court decision or the issue in the
decision is recorded under "% agree w/decision," while those responding negatively
to the decision or related issue are recorded under the "% disagree with decision."
Secondly, A few poll responses were not categorized by the polling agency in a
dichotomous fashion (i.e. an affirmative response, a negative response, and no
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opinion). In these cases response categories were collapsed into a dichotomous
fashion. There are two instances where this was done. The first, is the polling question
that asked respondent about integration and the issues associated with the Brown II
case o f 1955. The question and responses follow:
In many communities in the Deep South states, the number o f colored school
children is greater than the number o f white school children. Would you say
that these communities in the South should be required to integrate schools
immediately, should they be given a few years to do this, should they be given
a longer time such as 10 to 20 years, or should they not be required to
integrate at all? (Gallup 1958, 9/10-15/58)
Immediately
In a few years
10 to 20 years
Never
Uncertain

29%
25%
8%
31%
7%

With these responses, I collapsed the "immediate" and "in a few years"
categories as affirmative responses, while the "10 to 20 years" and "never" categories
were classified as negative responses. The "uncertain" response is retitled as no
opinion.
The second occurrence where response categories were collapsed is the polling
question which reflects opinion on issues raised in the Alexander vs. Holmes Co.
Board o f Education case. The question and responses follow:
Do you think that racial integration is going too fast or not fast enough?
(Gallup 1970, 2/27-3/2/70).
Too fast
Not fast enough
About right
No opinion

48%
17%
21%
14%

Here, the response categories labeled "Not fast enough" and "about right" are
collapsed into one response category as in agreement with issues decided in Brown II,
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while the "too fast category" remains intact, but recategorized as in disagreement with
Brown II. No opinion remains intact.
Getting back to the question o f whether or not the Warren Court is an activist
(antimajoritarian) Court, data collected provides insight. Looking at Table l,the
reader can see that the cases are listed in chronological order with their classification
o f the decision listed, and percentages o f response categories. Within this listing, 11
o f the cases are classified as restraintist, 7 activist, and 3 unclear. From this sample, it
appears as if the Warren Court is mostly restraintist from 1954-1967, with the majority
o f the activist rulings occurring in the last two years o f the Court (1968-1969). In
this sample, the last two years o f activist ruling when compared to the previous 13
years o f mostly restraintist decisions is interesting. I do not assume to know why this
is the case, but it appears that in each block o f time (the 13 year and the 2 year) the
Warren Court was either strongly reflective o f nationwide opinion or strongly
nonreflective. When the "not determinable" cases are removed, all restraintist
decisions were classified as such by at least a 12 percentage point spread between
those agreeing and those disagreeing. There is a similar result with the activist
decisions. Here, the public opposed the rulings by at least a 10 percentage points over
those who agreed with the decision. This condition in o f itself would have posed
problems for the Court. The fact that the last two years of the Court may have been
more activist-with less popular support probably increased saliency for Court critics
such as Bickel. On a more empirical note, it is apparent that the Warren Court overall
lost some credibility among the population. Table 2 shows a series o f ratings o f the
Supreme Court over the length o f the Warren Court period. As is evident, the
Supreme Court's "excellent" and "good" ratings decline significantly from 1963 to
1969, while the "fair" and "poor" ratings increased 5% and 8% respectively from 1963
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to 1969. Still, when the focus is placed on the entirety o f this Court period, the
Warren Court remains a restraintist Court. Table 3 addresses this.
As you can see, the Warren Court rulings are congruent with majority-public
opinion over 52% of the time, in this sample, when unclear majorities are included.
Unclear majorities are those in which the approval and disapproval ratings are within
0-5 percentage points o f one another, which is the threshold for .05 alpha/95%
significance. More importantly though, is the fact that the Warren rulings are in line
with majority opinion 61% o f the time, in this sample, when the unclear majorities are

excluded. This 61% exceeds the 50% random-choice base level necessary when
unclear majorities are dropped.
In and o f themselves, these numbers say that the Warren Court era did reflect
the opinion o f most people in the United States at the time of those decisions.
Consequently, the Court can be redefined as a restraintist court. The question
addressed later in this thesis is whether or not the Warren Court was as restraintist as
the Burger Court (assuming the Burger Court qualifies for restraintist classification ).
Going back to Thomas Marshall's original time period, where he evaluates the Court
from 1935-1986, we can assess how the Warren Era compares to this broader time
frame. Since I wish to discuss the Burger Era in the next chapter, I will exclude that
era from this discussion.
Court eras from 1936 until the Warren Era include the Hughes Court, the
Stone Court, and the Vinson Court. Thomas Marshall records the majoritarian and
antimajoritarian percentages from his study in Public Opinion and the Supreme Court
(1989). For these eras see Table 4.
Comparisons to these preceding Court eras shows the reader that the Warren
Court appears not to differ dramatically from majoritarian/antimajoritarian ruling
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Table 2
Gallup Supreme Court Public Opinion Ratings

In general what rating would you give
the Supreme Court-excellent, good, fair, or poor?

7/18-23/63
6/22-27/67
6/26-7/1/68
5/22-27/69

(E) 10%
(E) 15%
(E) 8%
(E) 8%

(G) 33%
(G) 30%
(G) 28%
(G) 25%

(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)

26%
29%
32%
31%

(P) 15%
(P) 17%
(P)21%
(P) 23%

(No
(No
(No
(No

Opinion) 16%
Opinion) 9%
Opinion) 11%
Opinion) 13%

Source: Gallup, George H. 1972. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971.
Volumes 1-3. New York: Random House.

Table 3
Warren Era Ruling Classifications and Frequency Distibutions
Classification

# restraintist(majoritarian)
# activist(antimajoritarian)
# unclear(closely divided)
Total

Raw #

11
7
3
21

% includes % excludes
unclear
unclear

(53%)
(33%)
(14%)
100%

(61%)
(38%)
99%

percentages o f the previous Vinson Era. The overall mean o f percent majoritarian
rulings for all the predecessors equals 65%, from which the Warren era does not
significantly differ. Therefore, it would have to be said that the Warren Court should
not be considered "out o f the ordinary" in the context o f past High Court rulings in
relation to majority percentages.
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Table 4
Supreme Court Agreement with Public Opinion, by Court Period, 1935-1969
(excluding instances o f "unclear" polls)

Hughes

% majoritarian
% antimajoritarian
Number o f cases

73%
27%
100%
(15)

Stone

Vinson

54%
46%
100%
(13)

68%
32%
100%
(19)

Warren

61%
39%
100%
(18)

Marshall, Thomas. 1989. Public Opinion and the Supreme Court. Boston: Unwin
Hyman. 87.

Still, critics o f the Warren Court point to the subject matter o f that time which
brought the Court into greater prominence than its predecessors. Issues in the Civil
Rights arena were greatly debated, and in the South, Civil Rights rulings were
significantly opposed. Perhaps the most renown case o f the Warren era is Brown vs.
Board of Education of Topeka Kansas. Although the overall poll results comprised a
majority o f the people in favor o f the Court's ruling, the South intensely differed. The
following is a recreation o f the 1954 Gallup Poll results:
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that racial segregation in the public
schools is illegal. This means that all children, no mater what their race, must
be allowed to go to the same schools. Do you approve or disapprove o f this
decision? (Gallup 1954,1249).
Approve
Disapprove
No Opinion

54%
41%
5%
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By Region

Approve
Disapprove
No Opinion

East

Midwest

South

West

72%
23%
5%

57%
37%
6%

24%
71%
5%

65%
31%
4%

As one can see, the South was adamantly opposed to this ruling, in particular
the act o f desegregation. Even so, in this landmark case, where the Court outright
overturned its own precedent (i.e. Plessy case), the majority o f Americans agreed with
the position and action o f the Court at the time the ruling was handed down.
Subsequent race relations decisions, such as Boynton vs. Virginia (1960) and Heart of
Atlanta Motel vs. U.S., continued to hold the support o f a majority o f Americans
despite the Court's change o f mind and the South's disapproval.
These dramatic reversals o f lower court and past High Court opinion lead me
to ask whether or not an overturning of a lower court decision is conducive to a lack
o f popular support. More precisely, I am asking if those cases that were classified as
antimajoritarian were predominantly reversals o f lower court decisions. These
questions get at the heart o f many Warren Court criticisms, since it is believed that
those local entities (i.e. county and state courts) who are reversed, often have greater
insight concerning the needs and desires o f the residents within their jurisdiction, and
therefore, should be given greater discretionary power in lawmaking, critics, such as
Bickel, have inferred that when the Court overturns a lower court decision that this is
specifically undemocratic and antimajoritarian for the reasons I just stated. Therefore,
if a vast majority o f the reversals o f the lower courts were unpopular with the nation,
Bickel's inference that the lower courts are more "in touch" with the public may have
some salience. Once again, I do not deny that judicial review is an undemocratic
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public consistently opposes? This line o f thought is brought into question if Supreme
Court reversals tend to reflect nationwide popular opinion in the majority o f cases.
As the Brown case has pointed out, dramatic regional differences do occur.
Yet, the questions concerning judicial review become far more prominent if not only
one region o f the nation disagrees with a reversal, but a majority o f all Americans. It
can often be expected that the "home" court ruling being reversed would stir
disenchantment among the regions citizenry. What would be most detrimental though,
would be a situation where High Court reversals o f lower court decision continually
spawned resentment from the nation.
O f the 21 cases studied in the Warren era, the Court's rulings reversed a lower
court judgment in seven instances. The national public reaction to these seven cases is
quite mixed. In three o f the seven, the public opinion polls indicate a majority in
agreement with the decision, (i.e. Brown (1954), Brown (1955), and Boynton (I960).)
Also, in three, the nation as a whole disagreed with the reversal decision, (i.e. Gideon
(1963), Abington (1963), and Jones (1968). The seventh case, Loving vs. Virginia
(1967), had a related poll which were split so close in public sentiment so as to be
determined "unclear."
Probably the most adamantly opposed ruling by the Court was that of
Abington vs. Schempp. This 1963 case disallowed recitation of Biblical passages or
the Lord's prayer in public schools by reason of the fourteenth amendment. An
overwhelming 70% o f Americans disagreed with this decree despite the clarity o f the
Constitution. Notwithstanding this enormous lapse o f congruity between the Court
and public sentiment concerning one High Court reversal, the Warren era fared 50-50
with the public overall in this sample. Three o f the six reversal had the support o f the
public, three did not, while the seventh case was too close to be determined. These
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reversals o f the lower court do not account for all o f the antimajoritarian behavior o f
the Court, only half. It is then apparent that we cannot draw the conclusion that
simply because the Court reverses a lower court ruling that the nation will disagree
since the frequency o f occurrence was split. Neither can we conclude that judicial
review necessarily leads to antimajoritarian decision making given the fact that in half
of the reversals, the Court was reflecting nationwide majority opinion (i.e. the "local"
courts were not). Within the context o f the Warren era and these case samples, it is
fair to say that the Court ,when exercising judicial review to reverse a lower court
decision, is less majoritarian than when in the process of affirmation—but it is not
a/rt/majoritarian.
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CHAPTER III

THE BURGER COURT AND PUBLIC OPINION:
COMPARISONS WITH THE WARREN ERA
The Burger Court is recognized by many scholars to be a restraintist Court,
since a vast majority o f its decisions were affirmations o f lower court opinion. Due to
its restraintist approach, the Burger Court was less likely to "force" social policy
initiatives than the Warren era (Lamb 1982, 7). This Court's deference to lower court
decisions, and its inclination to an increasingly narrow interpretation o f the
Constitution are characteristics that set it apart from its immediate predecessor.
Although there is always room for debate concerning the virtue o f lower court
deference and narrow Constitutional interpretation, the 30 cases studied here support
the conclusion that the Burger Court was a restraintist court—in the classical sense(i.e.
the Burger Court did affirm lower court decisions in a vast majority o f cases). Of the
thirty cases in this study, 73% (21) were rulings affirming lower court decision or
denials o f certiorari, which have the same effect.
A sample o f rulings o f the Burger Court (1975-1986) will now be compared
with related public opinion polls so that this restraintist classification can be assessed
within a majoritarian and representative context. The Burger cases are drawn from
this latter period since 1975 is when the Court comprised its "conservative" majority.
As with the Warren cases, the Burger Court decisions are rulings designated for the
public arena, and it is the public that must abide by the consequences o f these
judgments. Paradoxically, these important decisions are in the hands o f an
unelected,life tenured Court not directly accountable to those it rules on behalf of.
29
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Yet, as we have already seen with the Warren Court in Chapter II, these factors,
although undemocratic, do not necessarily compel antimajoritarian rulings. Using the
same methodology as used to analyze the Warren Court decisions, the Burger Court
rulings will be classified restraintist or activist based on whether or not they agree with
majority-public opinion.
The Burger Court cases are chronologically ordered in Table 5, and classified as
restraintist(R), activist(A), or not determinable(ND). These classifications are based on
public opinion poll data that specifically or generally reference a Burger Court case or
issues o f a Burger Court case, and whether or not the public agreed with the ruling.
Without regard to lower court rulings, these decisions are restraintist if the majority of
the public, determined by polls, agree with the ruling, activist if the majority did not
agree, or not determinable if there is no clear majority. The frequency distributions o f
the polls that are "matched" with the particular cases are also listed (See Appendix A
for poll questions). All poll frequencies are listed in the table as "% agreeing with
decision" and "% disagreeing with decision." Due to the fact that poll response
categories change frequently from poll to poll, these two categories were devised to
standardize the relationship between the poll frequencies and the case they are
"matched" with.
The thirty case sample outlined in Table 5 shows the Burger Court to be greatly
restraintist from 1976-1978 with 10 o f the 11 determinable poll majorities agreeing
with the Court's decisions. On the other hand, in 1979 the Court disagreed with public
opinion in 4 o f the 6 available cases. This concentration o f activist decisions may be
one reason for the overall level o f public confidence in the Supreme Court dipping to
its lowest point since 1973 (Gallup 1983, 175). Only 45% o f the nationwide
respondents replied that they had a "great deal or quite a lot" o f confidence in the
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Table 5
Burger Court Case List with Frequency Distributions

Year Supreme Court Case

% Agree w/decision
o f Court

% Disagree w/decision
o f Court

1) 1976 Doe v City o f Rich.-ND

43%

43%

2) 1976 Wood. v. Nrth. Cr.-A

28%

72%

3) 1976 Buckley v. Valeo-R

65%

24%

4) 1976 Buckley v. Valeo-R

72%

21%

5) 1976 Gregg v. Georgia-R

65%

28%

6) 1977 Gaylord v. Taco. -R

65%

27%

7) 1977 Coker v. Georgia-R

53%

32%

8) 1977 Carey v. Population-R

90%

8%

9) 1977 N.Y. & N.J. v. Brit.-ND

45%

48%

10) 1977 Smith v. U.S.-R

56%

38%

11) 1978 Zurcherv. Stanford-ND

48%

43%

12) 1978 Un. ofCal. v. Bakke-R

65%

31%

13) 1979 Delaware v. Prowse-R

53%

44%

14) 1979 Moore v. Duckwort-R

75%

20%

15) 1979 Goldwaterv. Carter-A

18%

68%

16) 1979 U.S. v. Rutherford-A

22%

53%

17) 1979 Smith v. Maryland-A

13%

81%
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Table 5-Continued

Year Supreme Court Case

% Agree w/decision
o f Court

% Disagree w/decision
o f Court

18) 1980 Harris v. McRea-A

44%

56%

19) 1980 FuIIilive v. Klutzn.-R

70%

22%

20) 1981 PATCO v. U.S.-R

68%

28%

21) 1981 Rostkerv. Goldburg-R

80%

15%

22) 1981 Rostkerv. Goldburg-R

.50%

43%

23)1981 Beller v. Lehman-A

36%

52%

24) 1981 Kass. v. Con.Frht.-ND

45%

43%

25) 1982 Ed. Isl. Trees v. Pico-R

62%

28%

26) 1983 Bob Jones v. U.S.-R

71%

23%

27) 1983 Quilici v. Mort. Gr.-ND

44%

48%

28) 1983 MVMA v. St. Farm-R

50%

44%

29) 1984 N .Y v. Quarles-R

53%

41%

30) 1986 Stamosv. Spring Br.-R

91%

6%

Court—this is down from 49% who responded similarly in 1975. The years, 19801986, profile a mostly restraintist Court with 9 o f the 12 cases agreeing with majoritypublic opinion.
A compilation of this data in Table 6 exemplifies the majoritarian decision
making o f the Burger Court. O f the 30 cases studied, 19 are classified as restraintist, 6
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as activist, and 5 were unclear due to very close frequencies (within 5% points o f each
other). With the inclusion of the unclear cases, 63% of the 30 case sample o f the
Burger Court is restraintist decisions. The exclusion of the unclear cases results in
restraintist decisions increasing to 76% o f the 30 case sample. With over three
quarters o f all decisions in this sample qualifying as restraintist, the Burger Court may
be one o f the most representative Courts in recent history.
It is important to note that my results o f the Burger sample differ substantially
from Thomas Marshall's 1989 study. Table 7 outlines Marshall's results. From a
database of 65 cases and "matching" polls, Marshall reports that only 62% o f the
Burger Court cases qualify as majoritarian when unclear cases are excluded.
Marshall's findings reveal the majoritarian percentages o f the Burger Court to be
almost identical to those of the Warren Court. Thus, despite the indignation o f many
scholars about the supposed overwhelming antimajoritarian behavior o f the Warren
Court, Marshall’s report suggests that the amount o f Warren Court antimajoritarian
decision making does not significantly differ from either the Burger Court nor the
Warren predecessor, the Vinson Court.
A statement by Alexander Bickel invites further questions about the
"overwhelming" antimajoritarian behavior o f the Warren Court and its extensive use o f
judicial review: "judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system...[Wjhen
the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or action o f an elected
executive, it thwarts the will o f representatives of the actual people o f the here and
now; it exercises control, not in behalf o f the prevailing majority, but against it"
(Bickel 1986, 16-17). Bickel did not rely upon any empirical evidence to support his
claims, and in chapter two, it was evident that in cases where the Court's power of
judicial review overturned a previous ruling, 50% were not antimajoritarian. The
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Table 6
Burger Era Ruling Classifications and Frequency Distributions
Classification

# restraintist(majoritarian)
# activist(antimajoritarian)
# unclear(closely divided)
Total

Raw #

% includes
unclear

% excludes
unclear

19
6
5
30

(63%)
(20%)
(17%)
100%

(76%)
(24%)
100%

Table 7
Supreme Court agreement with Public Opinion, by Court Period, 1935-1986
(excluding instances of "unclear" polls)

Hughes

% majoritarian
% antimajoritarian

Number o f cases

Stone

Vinson

Warren

Burger

73%
27%
100%

54%
46%
100%

68%
32%
100%

61%
39%
100%

62%
38%
100%

(15)

(13)

(19)

(18)

(65)

Marshall, Thomas. 1989. Public Opinion and the Supreme Court. Boston: Unwin
Hyman. 87.

Burger Court data reveals similar results. In the 30 case sample, 8 cases were
reversals of lower court opinion. If Bickel is right, these exercises o f judicial review
should result in unpopular, antimajoritarian rulings. This is not the case. The eight
reversals were comprised o f three decisions which defied popular opinion, four cases
which sided with the nationwide majority, and one case where the polling frequencies

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

35
were too close to determine a majority opinion. Hence, 57% o f the Burger Court
reversals were favorable to the majority o f Americans (when the unclear case is
removed). As with the Warren Court, the Burger Court was less frequently
majoritarian when reversing the lower court ruling, but not predominantly
antimajoritarian.
Thus far, the Warren and Burger Courts have proven quite similar when
empirically compared. Yet, an interesting statistical difference among the two Courts
exists. As reported in Chapter II, the Warren Court, when in agreement with public
opinion, averaged a 12 percentage point spread between those favoring the ruling and
those opposed. When not in agreement with majority opinion (activist rulings), the
frequencies o f those opposed were, on average, greater by 10 percentage points. This
seems to suggest that the Warren Court rulings were either predominantly favorable,
or predominantly unfavorable. Yet, when these average frequency distribution
differences are compared to those existing within Burger Court polls, the
interpretation changes. On average, the Burger Court frequency difference between
those agreeing with the Court's rulings and those opposed was 36 percentage points
for both restraintist and activist decisions. This Court era had extremely strong support
when ruling favorable to the majority, while suffering a tremendous lack of support for
activist policies.
Using Thomas Marshall's statistics for the Burger Court (Table 7), which
suggest that it ruled similar percentages o f majoritarian and antimajoritarian cases as
the Warren Court, the differences in support for the rulings o f each Court eras may
indicate one reason for the indignation of some Warren Court critics. Even though the
majority o f Warren Court cases were reflective o f majority popular opinion, that
opinion was not particularly strong in light of the solid support for restraintist Burger
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Court decisions. Not only was the Warren Court drawing considerable attention to
itself (at least among scholars) because it overturned a number o f lower court rulings
and past Court precedent ( i.e. Brown), but the Warren Court did not receive a
popular "mandate" for its decisions. In other words, the Warren Court did have
popular approval for most rulings, but it was not the overwhelming majorities needed
to contradict criticisms that the Warren Court was thwarting popular will. On the
other hand, the Burger Court was, during the mid to latter seventies, hailed as a
restraintist Court because o f its deference to lower court opinion, but the Court also
enjoyed concrete popular support for its majoritarian cases—dimming the negative
effects o f its antimajoritarian rulings.
One reason the Warren Court did not experience substantial majorities in its
restraintist decision making may be that public opinion was in the process o f change on
many issues during the middle fifties to latter sixties. David Bamum in "The Supreme
Court and Public Opinion" points out that upward trends in public opinion support for
several issues dealt with by the Warren Court were increasing favorable o f the Court's
rulings (1985, 655). Issues such as abortion, busing, and a women's role where
gaining in support during these trying years. The problem remained that many still
comprised a minority of support, and in those that consisted o f a majority, the majority
was not substantial. Much o f the evidence today shows that these issues (i.e. abortion,
busing, and women's roles) tend to level off somewhere at the mid to upper forty
percentiles. Public opinion concerning issues addressed by the Burger Court may be
quite different. It is possible that a number o f the majoritarian decisions o f the Burger
Court benefitted from relatively stable and determined opinion on many issues. The
sizable majorities encountered in the restraintist decisions o f the Burger Court suggest
this may be so. Issues such as capital punishment and school prayer were typically
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one-sided issues with respect to public opinion. The Burger Court, by ruling agreeably
with the majority opinion, put itself in favor with the public.
In the following chapter, I will address this possibility in more length by
assessing the policy preferences o f Americans in these two eras and how these
preferences have varied. It may become evident that the Warren and Burger Courts
ruled in very different social "climates" by which each has been judged. Although
history tells us this is so, I will rely upon the studies of several authors whose research
looks at this topic in depth. There is a need to research whether the labels o f the
Warren Court's "liberalism" and the Burger Court's "conservatism" are valid. This
"validity" deals not only with the labels inherent meanings, but also with the concepts
o f "liberalism" and "conservatism". As may become apparent, these labels and
concepts change their meanings from generation to generation. Rulings made in the
times o f the fifties and sixties may be far removed from the policy preferences o f
justices and the public in the seventies and eighties. Analyzing each o f these Court
periods within its own context is the best approach since the factors and experiences of
the times may differ considerably from what is known in the present age.
Was the Warren era a particularly "liberal" era? Was the Burger era an
especially "conservative" era? I believe this will be the case since justices are not as
willing to "drive" against popular opinion as often as we would like to think.
Although each era has its unpopular decisions, most remained agreeable to the public.
Assuming that these Court eras are "liberal" and "conservative" eras respectively, this
would suggest that it is the public that has changed in its ideology, along with the
Warren and Burger Court eras.
The following discussion will take these factors into account. By defining
what is meant by the terms "liberal and "conservative" it will become evident how each
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o f the Court period's labels are justified. The regulatory and humanitarian rulings o f
the Warren era are indicative o f it's liberalism, while the Burger Court's conservatism
is evident in rulings that tend to be o f the status-quo and supportive o f federalism.
Despite these differing approaches to the rule o f law, each Court era ruled favorable to
the public in a majority o f their cases. Just how public opinion and the Court changed
over these few decades is discussed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER IV

NATIONAL LIBERALISM AND THE
WARREN AND BURGER COURTS
The purpose o f this chapter is to analyze the relationship, if any, between the
level of national liberalism and the liberalism of Court rulings. The basic question
being asked is whether there is some association between the rulings handed down in
the Warren Era and Burger Eras, and a rise or fall in liberalism. Specifically, did the
Warren Court hand down liberal rulings during a nationally liberal climate, and did the
Burger Court hand down rulings during a nationally conservative climate? This
analysis assumes the Warren Court label of "liberal" and the Burger Court label of
"conservative." These labeling assumptions are in no way pejorative. There is no
reason to believe that each Court era does not conform to these labels given the liberal
policy outcomes reflective in such Warren Court decisions as desegregation (Brown,
1954), securing criminal rights (Gideon, 1963), and safeguarding civil rights
(Jones, 1968), while the Burger era is marked with conservative stances on homosexual
behavior (Doe, 1976), the death penalty (Coker, 1977) and abortion (Harris, 1980).
Still, there is a need for more accurate measurement criteria by which one can
determine what is conservative and what is liberal.
Those Americans in tune with politics often hear about liberals and
conservatives, the policies they support, the groups that are associated with them, and
the policy preferences each group may have. Still, the labels are ambiguous to a large
percentage o f the electorate who do not understanding the meaning o f "liberal" and
"conservative" nor the issue positions they imply (Knight 1985). For those Americans
39
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who do find some understanding in these terms, the understanding remains abstract
simply because these terms can change within the diversity o f the descriptor and his or
her concept o f liberalism. Tom W. Smith's remarks concerning liberalism indicate that
it "is a chimera that has changed its emphasis and even some key tenants over time"
(Smith 1990). Even though this remains a problem for those studying components of
liberalism, there are definitions that reflect these major tenants.
Tom W Smith in his article "Liberal and Conservative trends in the United
States," defines contemporary liberalism with respect to its attributes:
(1) reformist, opting for change and generally opposed to the status quo; (2)
democratic, favoring a full extension o f electoral rights; (3) libertarian,
supporting free speech and the right to protest; (4) regulatory and
interventionist, backing the management o f business and the economy by
the government; (5) centralist, using the federal government to set and
enforce national standards and regulate state and local governments; (6)
humanitarian, favoring a social welfare system for the care and protection o f
society in general and the lower class in particular; (7) egalitarian,
advocating equal treatment for all and perhaps equal conditions for all; and
(8) permissive, tolerating and often approving o f nontraditional lifestyles
and practices (e.g., homosexuality, nudity and the use o f drugs) (1990,
481).
Conservatives, on the other hand, typically prefer conditions that are limited to
incremental change if not o f the status quo, are non-regulatory and noninterventionist,
in favor o f securing more powers to the states, and perhaps less permissive of
nontraditional practices. It can be expected that not all those who call themselves
"liberals" or "conservatives" will conform to each o f the above criteria, but probably a
majority o f the criteria.
Determining whether national attitudes were conservative or liberal at
particular periods in time is not an exact science. Many polls have asked direct
questions concerning political identification such as Gallup's "Do you regard yourself
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as a liberal or conservative." Even with this supposed "direct" approach to measuring
political identification, there are problems because this type o f question assumes the
respondent has a clear idea about what "liberal" and "conservative" mean. As James
Stimson points out in his book, Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and

Swings, respondents often do not identify themselves in either "camp" based on some
consistent self-analysis, but a response "is primed more by current events than by
lasting conceptions o f what the words entail" (1991,122).
Other analyses concerning liberal and conservative trends measures each
position in reference to particular policy preferences. This suggests that conservatives
often take opposing stances on policy issues from those o f the liberal persuasion.
Going back to Tom Smith's definition o f liberalism, we would expect liberal policies to
be more regulatory, centralist in nature, and perhaps have a greater humanitarian
emphasis than those policies called "conservative." Hence, ideological identification
would depend on which policies you support and how adamantly you support them.
A third method for measuring liberal trends in the United States also references
policy preferences as indicators o f liberalism or conservatism, but it takes this many
steps further. Using a conglomeration of survey data measuring policy preferences
obtained from various survey houses, James Stimson (1991) takes these scores and
standardizes them to one scale in order to identify patterns among the data. His
findings suggest that Americans, throughout several decades, "cycle" and "swing" in
relatively similar patterns of greater liberalism or conservatism from time to time.
Stimson suggests that this is indicative o f what he calls a "policy mood" within the
public; revealing eras in America where policy preferences ebb and flood along liberal
and conservative lines.
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This is only a brief introduction to the various methods used to measure liberal
and conservative identification. I will discuss in more depth these analyses and their
impact later in this study. First o f all, discussion of the purpose o f these studies is
needed. At the outset o f this chapter I indicated that the focus o f this section is to
determine the "climate" in which Warren and Burger Court rulings were made.
Assuming that the designation o f the Warren Court as liberal and the Burger Court as
conservative is accurately ascribed, based upon the nature o f their rulings and the
definitions as proposed, it is possible to describe and compare the political
environment that exists during these Court eras by studying the research findings of
the aforementioned authors. All have identified somewhat similar periods o f liberalism
and conservatism in the American polity, although with different measurement
techniques. I will then examine these time periods identified as liberal and
conservative in the literature, in order to determine whether or not they correspond to
liberal and conservative Court eras. Is there a liberal policy trend or identification
trend in the Warren era? Is there a conservative policy trend or identification trend in
the Burger era? What is the evidence that suggests these associations?
The purpose o f this chapter then, is mainly to identify the state o f national
"policy mood" during these periods, and whether there is any association between
liberal court rulings and national liberalism or conservative court rulings and national
conservatism. In subsequent chapters, I will discuss what impact this may have had on
the Warren and Burger Court rulings, whether or not the Warren Court and Burger
Courts may have deferred to this public sentiment, and how these findings are
important.
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Ideological Identification
Consistent polling questions concerning a person's ideological identification
have been around since the early to mid-seventies (Smith, 1990). This data is
important in some aspects mainly because researchers are able to see whether or not
people perceive themselves as more conservative or more liberal. This, o f course, is a
aggregated response without knowledge o f how an individual might have changed, but
overtime trends can be determined on how the group has or has not changed. Has the
electorate become more conservative? more liberal? I emphasize the limitations to this
type of study which asks the simple question about ideological self-identification ("Do
you consider yourself a liberal, moderate, or conservative?"), and assumes that the
aggregate response measures exactly what has been asked. Many times, people may
be unclear about the "liberal" or "conservative" terms.
The authors o f The American Voter (1960), revealed the quality o f ideological
conceptualization among citizens. This research evaluates ideological conception on
several levels by coding responses to open-ended questions measuring ideological
identification. Further research that utilizes this measurement technique suggests that
over 30% of the electorate comprise the two least sophisticated conceptualization
categories (Knight 1985, 839). One third o f voter's conceptualizations are
characterized by either "nature o f times" responses, or "no issue content" responses.
Individuals within the "nature o f times" category "are sufficiently attentive to the
political world to praise or blame the party in power for current economic or social
conditions" (Knight 1985, 831). These bare associations between current times and
the party holding political power are indicative o f "simple reward and punishment
strategies." "No issue content" responses is either no response at all, or simplistic
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identification with the party or candidate's personality. This lack o f understanding by
many respondents complicates studies on ideological identification that simply ask a
person to categorize themselves as a conservative, liberal, or moderate.
Even with all the complications, analysis o f this sort is valuable. We may be
able to detect major fluctuations in identification, and from there clarify the research to
pinpoint the source o f the fluctuation. For example, did Americans in the 1980's
identify themselves as conservatives, and if so, can a causal explanation be found?
Possibly, the Reagan Revolution? A 1970's backlash? Or, is it just a part o f the larger
cycle of liberal and conservative change in the polity from time to time?
The two studies that I would like to look at are Richard Niemi, John Mueller,
and Tom Smith's Trends in Public Opinion (1989) r.nd John Robinson and John
Fleishman's "Ideological Identification: Trends and Interpretations o f the LiberalConservative Balance" (1988). The findings provided by these two studies extends
from 1972 to 1986.
Each of the data sets (Niemi 1989, 19-21 & Robinson 1988, 141) "paint" a
similar picture about ideological identification in America. From the early seventies
through the mid-eighties measurements o f ideological self-identification has not
changed much. Within each classification, response percentages typically remain
within a 3-5 percent variance from year to year. Also, there appears to be no
consistent increases or decreases in self described liberalism or conservatism. Niemi et
al., data reports that an average o f 25% o f the sample consider themselves liberal, 31%
are moderate, and 31% say they are conservative. These finding reflect responses to
an "unfiltered" poll question. (The unfiltered version classifies respondents who
"haven't thought about it," where as a filtered version does not). Robinson and
Fleishman's percentages vary slightly due to different categorization, but remain
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consistent with the overall interpretation. Probably the most interesting point to make
is that in the Niemi et al., data set for liberal or conservative identification—the filtered
version—at least 16 to 34% o f those surveyed expressed that they had not thought
about their ideological identification. Between 1972 and 1986 an average o f 25% of
the population has not considered their ideological identification important enough to
think about it.
From this data it might be assumed that despite some considerable fluctuations
in American politics, particularly a change from a Democratic president to a
Republican one and a more conservative Supreme Court, that the American polity
remains unchanged with respect to ideological disposition. The research o f Tom W.
Smith (1990) suggests, however, that ideological preference is not so easily measured.
Policy Preferences
In his more comprehensive study, Tom W. Smith in "Liberal and Conservative
Trends in the U.S. (1990)" cross-tabulates several issues from the General Social
Survey (over time) and the responses with liberal and conservative indicators. In order
to define which position or response is to be classified as liberal or conservative, he
not only took into account the definition o f liberalism posed earlier, but also what the
policy preferences o f a widely recognized liberal group and a conservative group. The
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) responses are indicative o f liberal policy
preferences while the American Conservative Union (ACU) responses are reflective of
conservative preferences. Three other indicators to measure the liberal/conservative
leanings o f the GSS respondents were used: presidential vote in the 1972 and 1984
elections, and self-placement on a seven-point liberal/conservative scale. This GSS
study yielded 455 survey items which constructed several time-series between the
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years o f 1945 to 1986—not all time series are consistent. From these many series and
their measures on liberal/conservative scales, Smith is able to identify general liberal
and conservative trends in the post World War II era.
Smith's finding suggest that from 1945 until 1974 there is an obvious liberal
trend with respect to majority stances on policy issues (i.e. abortion, civil liberties,
feminism, etc.). In fact, these trends far outweighed the conservative policy trends
until 1974. From 1974 until the early eighties liberalism did dramatically decrease.
Smith notes that there is no reversal o f the overall liberal trend in America, but a halt
to liberal advance. In other words, liberal stances on many issues did reverse enough
to cause an overall "liberal plateau (Smith 1990, 496)." Smith states:
In brief, the balance o f liberal/conservative changes since World War II has not
been uniform over time. Many liberal trends leveled off and some even
reversed direction in the 1970s... overall society did not reverse from liberalism
to conservatism, but liberal gains o f the post-World War II period did level off.
While some liberal trends did reverse direction, the general shift was from
liberal advance to a liberal holding-pattem (1990, 499).
Even though Tom Smith has identified some important liberal trends in postWorld War II history, I would like to turn now to the final study that describes these
trends in a much more comprehensive manner.

Policy Mood
Policy mood is an aggregation o f views about government policy. The mood is
typically characterized by what a majority o f Americans think about policy issues over
extended time periods. James Stimson in Public Opinion in American (1991) attempts
to identify this mood throughout history; how it has changed and how it has remained
the same. Stimson's study is similar to Smith's 1990 study, yet quite complex when
compared to Smith's.
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In order to measure what Stimson calls "policy mood" a myriad o f survey data
is collected on various issues. These survey responses collectively identify the mood
o f Americans concerning particular issues over time. For each issue, there may be tens
to hundreds o f separate surveys completed over several decades with questions
directed at how or what the respondent thinks or feels about certain issues. Each
survey measures the mood at that particular point. Yet, if several points in time are
examined over many decades one can decipher trends and/or cycles in the public mood
with respect to that issue.
The most intriguing aspect about this study is that policy mood is an
aggregation o f majority opinions concerning several issues over many decades. It is
not, for example, the majority opinion about abortion over the last 40 years. So then,
mood can not be characterized by one issue, but by several issues. This is where the
complexity o f this study lies. Stimson's main question remains as to whether there is
any uniformity among available measures for a consistent mood to be identified. For
mood to exist, public opinions on several issues would have to change similarly over
time. On a conservative to liberal continuum, public opinion on several issues (such as
abortion, crime, and welfare) would need to register consistently over time as
conservative or liberal in order that a liberal or conservative mood could be identified.
This is very difficult since all surveys are not standardized with one another, and
survey questions that seek to measure support for particular policies are not similar
over time. James Stimson solves these difficulties through the aggregation o f the
survey data.
By using factor analysis and many other statistical techniques, Stimson is able
to standardize survey responses over time into an aggregate measure o f liberalism.
The use o f these standardized responses, measures aggregate increases or decreases in
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liberal attitudes(which were based on policy preferences over time). Figure 1 models
this methodology.
Survey data concerning issues o f education, health, race, urban problems, and
welfare are plotted on a standardized scale o f liberalism. As one can see there appear
to be some very consistent patterns forming what Stimson calls "policy mood."
Particularly, from 1975 through 1989 the trend appears to be heading in a more liberal
direction after the more conservative responses o f the mid to latter seventies. Hence,
on domestic issues o f education, health, race, urban problems, and welfare the
American policy mood in these areas is becoming more liberal, in the aggregate,
during the eighties when compared to responses of the seventies. Expanding this
method, Stimson provides a data summary in Figure 2.
With all the survey data collected on the various issues that comprise domestic
policy mood, Figure 2 provides a graph of the results. The graph presents the degree
o f domestic policy mood liberalism and its association with liberalism from 1956-1989.
The center horizontal line represents the mean (average) liberal mood for 1956-1889.
The widths around the middle line which graphs domestic policy mood across time are
"zones o f acquiescence." These widths represent plus and minus one standard
deviation from the line representing policy mood. From the graph we can see that
1956-1963 was a time of growing liberalism about what government should do in
domestic policy areas. After a brief, steep decline from 1963-1966 an upward trend
begins with fluctuations through 1974. From 1974-1980 a general conservative
ascent(liberal descent) is prominent only to be countered from 1981-1989 with a
fluctuating, yet gradual, liberal ascent.
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Figure 1. Five Components o f the Welfare State on a Common Scale
(Stimson 1991, 72).
Source: Stimson, James. 1991. Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, &
Swings. Boulder: Westview Press.
Used with permission o f James Stimson.
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Figure 2. Policy Mood With Zones o f Acquiescence Estimated From Standard
Regression Errors (Stimson 1991, 118).
Source: Stimson, James. 1991. Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, &
Swings. Boulder: Westview Press.
Used with permission o f James Stimson.
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Policy Mood in the Warren and Burger Eras
This last and most comprehensive study measuring liberal policy mood offers
some insight about the American "climate" in which decisions by the Courts have been
decided. During the Warren years policy mood fluctuated. From 1956-1963 domestic
liberalism continued to gradually increase above the mean liberal mid-point. A
dramatic decrease from 1963-1965 and fluctuations towards the end o f the era pose
interesting questions: Is it possible that the "great liberalism" o f the Court in the fifties
and early sixties created a domestic policy backlash which called for a more
conservative approach? Although this measurement o f Stimson's does not specifically
address the aggregate polity response to Court decisions, the Court was a prominent
component in the making o f domestic policy. Either way, no concrete response can
address this question and any absolute answer should be avoided, but it is this type of
question that will be considered in the following chapter.
The Burger Court has experienced quite a different set o f liberal indicators.
Court activity from 1974-1981 occurs in a "climate" where a gradual slide into greater
conservatism is evident. Even so, the Burger Court finishes its final years in a climate
of growing liberal domestic policy preferences. In this view, the question concerning
a domestic policy backlash asked about the Warren Court could similarly be asked of
the Burger Court period. Each Court (Warren and Burger) has delivered decisions in
the first half o f its tenure within a congenial "climate;" the Warren Court's liberal
decisions within a time o f liberal policy mood and the Burger Court in a time o f
conservative policy mood. Still, the second half o f each Court's tenure shows a shift
away from the liberal and conservative dispositions o f the respective Courts. These
situations and the questions they pose will be considered in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V

JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
The notion o f judicial deference, typically referred to as judicial restraint,
embraces several self-imposed standards that limit justices' discretionary powers and
restrict arbitrary decision making. Supreme Court deference with respect to lower
court decisions involves a yielding of the Courts judicial review power in lieu o f the
lower court ruling. Amongst the three branches of government, Supreme Court
deference implies respect for the separation of powers between the Court, the
Congress and the Executive. Although the Court has review power with
congressional legislation as well as executive orders, many Court's exhibit a reluctance
to scrutinize these laws for fear o f crossing institutional boundaries o f jurisdiction.
These common illustrations o f judicial deference will be addressed in this chapter,
along with a less common association: judicial deference to the public environment.
This association suggests that the public environment or "climate" that Court
periods rule within may have some effect on the nature o f those rulings. Levels o f
national liberalism and the destinations of "policy mood," as articulated in the previous
chapter, are thought to help define the role perceptions of particular Court periods.
Hence, the Warren Court's liberal rulings are a reflection of national liberalism and
liberal policy preferences. The same may be the case for the Burger Court.
Conservative Court decisions become a product o f declining national liberalism and
heightened conservative "policy mood" in the public. The issues o f judicial deference
posed by each o f these illustrations is addressed within the context o f democratic

51
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theory, providing an often complex discussion concerning the balance o f government
power and the proper role o f the Supreme Court.
Supreme Court deference with respect to the Court's appellate jurisdiction is
defined by familiar phrases such as: original intent, justicibility, and statutory
construction. These self imposed restraints place limits on the Supreme Court's power
to adjudicate cases arising from the States. Charles Lamb, in Supreme Court Activism

and Restraint (1982), outlines six important maxims o f restraint (Abraham 1980, 373).
These maxims are: (1) justices must abide by the intentions o f the framers of law, (2)
justices should be extremely reluctant to exercise the power o f judicial review, (3) the
Supreme Court should avoid constitutional questions whenever possible, (4) decide
legal issues based on the specific record o f the lower courts, (5) the Court will not
issue advisory opinions, (6) the Court will not answer political questions (Lamb 1982,
15). Despite these impositions, judicial review is a powerful tool of the Court when in
use. Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist #78, validates the Court's power should a
statute conflict with the Constitution:
The interpretation o f the laws is the proper and peculiar province o f the courts.
A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental
law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as any
meaning o f any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there
should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has
the superior obligation and validity ought, o f course, to be preferred; or, in
other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention
o f the people to the intention o f their agents (1961, 525).
The Court's review power also extends to congressional legislation and
executive orders that contradict the Constitution. Even so, Alexander Hamilton
attempts to make it quite clear that this power does not imply the supremacy o f the
judiciary to either the legislative or executive branch.
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Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority o f the judicial to
the legislative power. It only supposes that the power o f the people is superior
to both; and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes,
stands in opposition to that o f the people, declared in the Constitution, the
judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought
to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which
are not fundamental (Hamilton 1961, 525).
With the infusion o f judicial review as a mode to check the legislative and
executive branch, judicial deference to the separation o f powers can become a
circumscribed observance in light o f the judiciary's obligations. Hence, the maxim that
justices should be extremely reluctant to use judicial review. This reveals quite a
paradoxical situation for the Court. On one hand, the Court is the guardian o f the
Constitution with judicial review as its weapon against those forces that may betray
the law. Yet, on the other hand, maxims o f restraint suggest that this should be used
sparingly, if at all! This situation exemplifies the relative nature o f restraint. Since
there are no formal rules or regulations concerning the use o f judicial review, the
perceived obligation to invoke review o f a congressional or state action is not at all
consistent among justices or Court periods. The extent o f its use is typically
determined by a justice's role perception.
How does the Court think it should function within a democratic society? The
restraintist asserts that the arbitration of law is the primary function o f the Court, not
the practice o f social policy making. The emphasis is then placed on the means of
decision making, not the ends. If the statute is not in conflict with constitutional law,
yet socially inadequate, it still is not the business o f the Court, but the duty o f the
representatives to "cure." Congress' inherent function is that o f policy making, and any
infringement is in violation o f the separation o f powers, if not wholly undemocratic.
Although this was the adamant viewpoint o f the "great restraintist" Justice Frankfurter,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

54
the majority o f the Warren Court appointees observed that the law is social policy, and
felt it impossible to extricate one from the other.
The Warren Court's perception o f its role in society was vastly different from
those o f Courts both before and after. Cases involving race relations, First
Amendment rights, rights o f the accused, and reapportionment flooded the Court with
precedent setting potential. The Warren Court used its abilities to foster some
assemblage o f racial equality, strengthen the "guaranties'1elaborated in the bill o f
rights, and insure equal representation. The Warren Court years were, at times, years
of social turmoil and turbulence for the structures o f government. Within this context,
there was not only great need for conflict resolution but a prevailing sense among
Americans that a change in social policies by government was desperately necessary.
As James Stimson points out, the mid-fifties through the early sixties was a time of
growing liberalism about what government should do in domestic policy areas
(Stimson 1991, 119).
It is this "policy mood" o f Americans that may have spawned much o f the
liberal decisions of the Warren Court. Instead o f deferring to lower court
jurisprudence or allowing the lengthy deliberative process o f Congress to enact
legislation for conflict resolution, the Warren Court took an active role that the
majority of Americans were calling for and agreed with. By choosing to rule in such
landmark cases as Brown vs. Board (1955), the Court made it clear that it perceived
itself as far more than an adjudicator o f the law; the Court was aware o f its policy
making function.
Just as the political environment changes so to judicial role perceptions change.
1974 through 1980 reveal "policy mood" at its most conservative state in recent
history. As Figure 2 indicates, a restraintist (conservative) stance on what role
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government should play in society prevails. During this period, the Burger Court
embraced many maxims o f restraint typically refusing to perpetuate Warren Court
policy making. Richard Funston describes the Burger Court role perception: the Court
"exhibited a desire to transfer the burden o f solving society's difficult problems from
the judicial to the political process" (1977, 342).
The difficulty for each o f the Court periods is that "policy mood" fluctuates.
The Warren Court for almost ten years ruled amidst a liberal "climate" with growing
support for a majority of its policies and programs. But for a brief period from 19641966, a conservative and restraintist stance concerning the role o f government in
society is evident. Although the source o f this conservatism is not ascertainable, the
Warren Court seems to have dealt with the fluctuation. O f the 21 Warren Court case
sample, 5 decisions were within this time frame. All five rulings were agreeable to the
majority o f the public suggesting that the Court was able to adjust to changing
sentiment.
The growing liberalism in the latter years o f the Burger Court seemed to pose
no problems of support for this era either. From 1981 through 1986, liberalism
continued to ascend from its greatest decline in 35 years. This time frame consisted of
11 cases from the Burger Court sample. O f these 11 cases only one was
antimajoritarian, 2 unclear, with 8 majoritarian rulings. With the exception o f one
case, the Burger Court ruled favorably to public opinion majorities when the unclear
cases are excluded.
These fluctuations in "policy mood" can not be assumed as a reflection o f
whether the public agrees with particular Supreme Court decisions or not, since liberal
"policy mood" comprises public opinion measurements on a compilation of general
government activity. The fact there is a dramatic decrease in liberal "policy mood" in
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1964, therefore, can not be readily attributable to reaction to Supreme Court
decisions. Likewise, the liberal ascent occurring in the mid eighties cannot be assumed
as a negative reaction to rulings o f the Burger Court. Certainly, the Court is a
component in government policy making, but not the only one. Thus, it is almost
impossible to ascertain the specific source or reason such "backlash periods" occurred.
Even so, it remains important that during these dramatic reversals o f policy mood,
both the Warren and Burger Courts continued to reflect public opinion majorities. It is
surprising that while the public preferences about government policy making suddenly
changed, each Court remained reflective o f popular opinion.
This situation suggests that Supreme Court justices, if influenced by public
opinion, are influenced by current opinion. Thus, Court justices are far from being
"out o f touch" with the people's sentiments and themselves are "political creatures,
who are broadly aware of fundamental trends in ideological tenor o f public opinion,
and that at least some justices, consciously or not, may adjust their decisions at the
margins to accommodate such fundamental trends" (Mishler & Sheehan 1993, 89).
The idea that the Court is influenced by public opinion is not denied by some o f its
recent membership. Chief Justice Rehnquist has this to say about the influence of
popular opinion:
Judges, so long as they are relatively normal human beings, can no more
escape being influenced by public opinion in the long run than can people
working at other jobs. And, if a judge coming to the bench were to decide to
hermetically seal himself off from the manifestations o f public opinion, he
would accomplish very little; he would not be influenced by current public
opinion, but instead would be influenced by the state o f public opinion at the
time he came to the bench (Rehnquist, as cited in Mishler & Sheehan 1993,
89).
The most recent study to date concerning the possibility that judges are "in
touch" if not influenced by public opinion is that of William Mishler and Reginald

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57
Sheehan. Supreme Court decisions decided with full opinions and coded as to whether
the outcome was liberal or not are contained in the U.S. Supreme Court data base.
This data base includes almost all o f the seven thousand cases decided from 19561989. By taking each years decisions and the percent o f those decisions coded as
"liberal," the percent o f liberalism in each year is calculated. It is determined, as
expected, that a high percentage o f liberalism exists during the Warren years while a
low percentage o f liberalism exists during the Burger years.
Correlating this measurement o f Court liberalism with Stimson's measures of
liberal "policy mood" is the second major step o f this study, detecting the Court's
ability to respond to the public. Although there is somewhat of a lag in Court
response (about 5 years) the Court appears to reflect major fluctuations in "policy
mood" and the relative liberalism o f policy preferences of the public. The evidence o f
this is particularly clear during the times when domestic "policy mood" is contradictory
to the ideological composition o f that Court era. As discussed earlier, Stimson's
measure o f liberal "policy mood" identifies years o f conservatism during Warren Court
liberal composition as well as years o f ascending liberal "policy mood" during the
conservative composition o f the Burger Court. Even when Court orientation and
public attitudes do not coincide, the Court appears to defer to public opinion. In
Mishler and Sheehan's study, Warren Court decisions during the years o f conservative
"policy mood" (1964-67) are far more conservative than at any other year during the
Warren Court era (1993, 90-91). The Court decisions of the Burger years, when
public mood became increasingly liberal, also are more liberal (Mishler & Sheehan,
1993). The major exception to this trend begins in 1988 to 1989 (at the end o f the
available data). Here, "policy mood" continues to become increasingly liberal, while
the Rehnquist Court decisions are substantially more conservative. Standardized
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measures o f the liberalism o f public "policy mood" and the liberalism of Supreme
Court decisions register a 25 point gap, greater than in any other year since 1956
(Mishler & Sheehan 1993). Despite this recent divergence, it appears that the
Supreme Court over the last 30 years has reflected poplar opinion even when Court
ideology is not conducive to "policy mood."
Assuming that justices, and the Court in general, are influenced by public
opinion, the Supreme Court's role as a check on the "ill humors in the society" is
somewhat questionable. Unjust and partial laws that violate minority rights must be
cited for their unconstitutionality and revised. This is the province o f the Supreme
Court given the fact that this type o f relief can not come from anywhere else. Aside
from America's representative democracy, it can be effectively argued that the Court,
amidst its undemocratic procedures, is intended to be the defender o f minority rights.
As we can see, unbounded deference to public opinion raises serious questions.
In fact, judicial deference o f any order appears to contradict the Court's standing as an
independent branch. In the subsequent, concluding chapter I will review much o f the
previous sections o f this thesis to offer a normative analysis concerning the role o f the
Court in a representative democracy, as well as the proper role o f public opinion in the
Supreme Court. It is evident that the future legitimacy of the Supreme Court as a law
making institution is secured in the proper balance o f majoritarian decision making as
well as the protection of unpopular minority rights.
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CHAPTER VI

THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
The proper role o f the Supreme Court in society has been debated since the
beginning o f American Constitutional thought. Today, the debate seems more relevant
than ever given the increased effect that Court decisions have on our lives. No longer
does the Court deal with minor procedures such as the admission o f attorneys, but
decides cases in areas from abortion to race relations to interstate commerce (O'Brien
1990, 103). Given the fact that the Court does play a substantial policy making role in
American society, it is important to note that these decisions are not made from the
proverbial "ivory tower." So that even though justices are accorded life tenure and the
Court deemed an independent institution, neither are isolated from the political arena.
Political factors such as majority-public opinion and the public environment
that opinion creates are influential in Supreme Court decision making. The Court
must, and does, take into consideration the effect a decision may have on those it rules
on the behalf of. Generally this situation is not perceived as a condition that
undermines judicial independence since general public support is a necessary
component for Supreme Court legitimacy. What remains questionable is the extent of
public approval the Court seeks, and how public opinion influences Court decisions.
Nowadays, when polling agencies can ascertain majority sentiment in a matter of
hours on any given subject and relay that sentiment immediately over a variety o f
communication linkages, the threat remains that the Supreme Court can be excessively
influenced by the will o f the majority.
59
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The problems that unchecked majority rule poses are not new. A few are
depicted by Alexander Hamilton over two hundred years ago including the trampling
o f minority rights by means o f unconstitutional legislation. Recent Supreme Court
cases in which the majority is believed to have played a role in influencing the Courts
decision to suspend constitutional rights to a minority are identifiable. Probably the
most well known is Korematsu vs. the United States (1944), where the Court ruled
that the internment o f Japanese-Americans during World War II was justifiable.
Another well known but less recent case, Plessy vs. Fergeson (1896), exemplifies how
justice can be abandoned when majority sentiment transcends the concerns o f a
suspension o f constitutional rights. For decades after the Civil War, blacks were
segregated from whites in all societal aspects under the rule o f "separate but equal"
which was permitted by the Supreme Court. These situations remind us that there is a
need to check public opinion when the majority pursues legislation that undermines
constitutionally protected rights.
Simply because a majority o f Americans agree on a particular issue does not
justify counter-constitutional laws. The Court's proper role in these fragile situations
is to mitigate the severity and confine the operation o f laws that are unconstitutional
(Hamilton 1961, 526). This can be a perplexing situation for the Court given their
obligation to uphold the Constitution, while relying upon general support o f the people
for legitimacy. Korematsu exemplifies a dangerous situation when passionate public
opinion influenced a Supreme Court ruling, creating an atmosphere where it was
evident that it was not in the best interest of the Court to disallow Japanese-American
internment. Ruling otherwise, the Court retained majority public approval and the
public in turn conferred legitimacy to the institution and its members.
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Majority-public opinion today has the potential to influence much more now
than at any other time in history. The extent of majority support for pending Court
cases and the issues they represent can be known in a matter o f hours. The support
ratings are then presented to the public over various communication networks, in
effect letting the justices know what the "right" ruling is. Today's media is also amply
poised to "expose" any antimajoritarian rulings by the Court. Therefore, it is possible
that Court legitimacy could languish in the midst o f a well publicized fury about the
undemocratic decision making o f the Court. In light o f controversy such as this it
must be remembered that the role o f the Supreme Court in our society is not that of a
purely representative, democratic institution.
The appointment and life tenure provisions for justices o f the Supreme Court
were instituted in order to preserve judicial independence, yet, while doing so they also
exemplify the undemocratic nature o f the institution. Alexander Hamilton makes it
quite clear in Federalist #78 that one o f the primary duties o f the Court is guardian o f
the Constitution and individual rights, not representation of majority will.
This independence o f the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution
and the rights o f individuals from the effects o f those ill humors, which the arts
of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes
disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily
give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a
tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the
government, and serious oppressions o f the minor party in the community.
Though I trust the friends o f the proposed Constitution will never concur with
its enemies, in questioning the fundamental principal of republican government,
which admits the right o f the people to alter or abolish the established
Constitution, whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness, yet it is
not to be inferred from this principle, that the representatives o f the people,
whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold o f a majority o f their
constituents, incompatible with the provisions in the existing Constitution,
would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions; or that
the Courts would be under a greater obligation to connive at infractions in this
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shape, than when they had proceeded wholly from the cabals o f the
representative body (Hamilton 1961, 527).
Given that the Court was not intended to be a purely representative democratic
institution, why should the Court be judged according to its relationship with the
public? In fact, the methodological foundation for studying the sample o f Warren and
Burger Courts cases in chapters two and three suggest that the Court's relationship to
the public is o f principal concern. By redefining the terms by which a Court is deemed
restraintist or activist (Chapter II), based solely on the Court's relationship with the
public, I am suggesting that this association is essential to understanding the decision
making process o f the Supreme Court. The answer to the above question lies in the
paradoxical situation the Court finds itself in.
While not intended to be a democratic institution, the Court still exists within a
representative democracy which holds the Court accountable for its actions. Supreme
Court rule o f law is only validated by the legitimacy that the public and surrounding
institutions confer. Since the Court has neither the enforcement powers o f the "sword
or purse," it relies upon other institutions and public acceptance to execute its
decisions (Marshall 1989, 131). The Court recognizes this situation, and despite
Hamilton's warnings or Constitutional support for its actions, the Court is likely to
defer to public sentiment particularly when public opinion is one-sided and intense
(Monroe 1974, 187-216).
This predicament o f the Court verifies that the balance o f principles concerning
repre-sentative democracy and constitutional rights can be a difficult one. The role
o f the Court must be one where the constitutionally founded rights o f the person(s) are
not unduly burdened by the will o f the majority. Despite pressures from the plurality
and its representatives, the Court must work as a check on our system o f majoritarian
rule in order to secure the rights o f all.
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Considerate men, of every description, ought to prize whatever will tend to
beget or fortify that temper in the courts; as no man can be sure that he may
not be to-morrow the victim o f the spirit o f injustice, by which he may be a
gainer to-day (Hamilton 1961, 528).
For those disturbed by the thought that the Court may be excessively swayed
by public opinion, there is some indication that "the linkage between public opinion
and the decisions o f the Court is imperfect and occurs after a significant delay"
(Mishler & Sheehan 1993, 97). William Mishler and Reginald Sheehan's study,
concerning the relationship between public opinion and the Court, suggests that the
Court may act "as a temporary buffer against public opinion, shielding the policy
process from... passions o f the moment" (1993, 97). According to this research, there
exists a five-year lag between aggregate policy preferences (policy mood) and Court
decisions. In actuality, the Court is typically not an immediate responder to the will of
the majority, possibly allowing for public opinion to temper. Also, as we have seen
from the data presented in previous chapters, the Court is reflective o f majority
opinion an average o f only 60% suggesting that the Court is not responsive to public
opinion an average o f 4 out o f 10 cases. Given these conditions: the notable delay
between majority opinion reaction and Supreme Court response, combined with the
imperfect association between public opinion and the Court, it is not apparent that the
public will dominates the Court's decision making process.
In conclusion, this study o f the Court and its relationship to public opinion
sketches the real life working o f the Court. Notwithstanding the intentions o f the
framers, students o f the Supreme Court must be particularly aware o f the fact that the
Court is not "above" the reach o f politics. The Supreme Court is a policy making
institution that exhibits potential for "will" and "force." Their decisions have
considerable impact on the daily lives of many Americans as both the Brown (1955)
case and the Roe (1973) case have shown. The conclusion that these elements of
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"will" and "force" are both tempered or heightened by public opinion illustrates the
dynamic and changing role o f the Supreme Court in American society.
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The following are those questions asked o f the public that reference Supreme
Court decisions. Questions are filed under the survey house and identified by interviewing
date. The number of the question (some in parenthesis) corresponds to the case number in
Tables 1 and 5.
I. GALLtJP (Warren Court Cases Only)
Gallup's typical survey size is 1500. Exact survey sizes for each question are not
available
1. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that racial segregation in the public
schools is illegal. This means that all children, no matter what their race, must be allowed
to go to the same schools. Do you approve o f this decision? [5/21-26/54]
2. In many communities in the Deep South states, the number o f colored school
children is greater than the number o f white school children. Would you say that these
communities in the South should be required to integrate schools immediately, should they
be given a few years to do this, should they be given a longer time such as 10 to 20 years,
or should they not be required to integrate at all? [9/10-15/58]
3. A judge in Little Rock, Arkansas, has put off bringing Negro and White
children together in the schools there for a period o f two and a half years. Do you
approve or disapprove o f this ruling? [7/10-15/58]
4. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that racial segregation on trains,
buses, and in public waiting rooms must end. Do you approve or disapprove o f this
ruling? [5/28-6/2/61]
5. The Supreme Court has ruled that as soon as the police arrest a suspect, he
must be warned of his right to remain silent and to have a lawyer. Only if he voluntarily
waives these rights may the police question him. If he wants a lawyer, but cannot afford
one, the state must pay the fee. The lawyer has the right to be present during the
questioning and advise the suspect to say nothing. The following question was asked of
those who said they followed the issue: Do you think the Supreme Court's ruling on
confession was good or bad? [7/8-13/66]
6. The United State Supreme Court has ruled that no state or local government
may require the reading o f the Lord's prayer or Bible verses in public schools. What are
your views on this? [6/21-26/63
7. Should policemen be permitted to join unions, or not? [10/8-13/65]
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8. How would you feel about a law that gave all persons-Negro as well as whitet’ne right to be served in public places such as hotels, restaurants, and theaters, and similar
establishments. Would you like to see Congress pass such a law, or not? [1/2-7/64]
9. As you know, the United States Supreme Court that the number of
representatives o f both the lower house and the Senate in all state legislatures must be in
proportion to the population. In most states this means reducing the number o f legislators
from the rural areas and increasing the number from urban areas. Do you approve or
disapprove o f this ruling? [7/23-28/64]
10. A law has been proposed that would allow the federal government to send
officials into areas where the turnout o f eligible adults in the last Presidential election was
so low that it suggested that some persons were denied the right to vote. These officials
would make sure Negroes and whites are given an equal opportunity to register and vote.
Would you favor or oppose such a law? [3/18-23/65]
11. In some European countries, automobile drivers suspected o f having
consumed too much alcohol are required to take a breath test or a blood test. Would you
favor or oppose a law in the United States that require such tests. [11/9-14/68]
12. Do you think the use o f marijuana should be made legal, or not? [10/2-7/69]
13. Some states have laws making it a crime for a white person and a Negro to
marry. Do you approve or disapprove o f such laws? [1/28-2/2/65]
14. Would you like to see Congress pass an open-housing law or reject it? [3/914/67]
15. As you know, many boys today wear their hair very long. Do you think the
schools should require boys to keep their hair cut short? [9/16-21/65]
16. The Federal Government in Washington decides to give money to aid
education, should this money go to all public schools, or should it be withheld from
schools which fail to integrate white and Negro students? [1/11-16/63]
17. Do you think Powell should be allowed to keep his seat or not. [1/26-31/67]
18. Do you think that persons who have come recently from some other place
should be required to live in the community for 60 days before they can get on relief, or
not? [n/a]
19. Do you think that racial integration is going too fast or not fast enough?
[2/27-3/2/70]
20. Do you think the use o f marijuana should be made legal? [n/a]
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II. GALLUP (Burger Court Cases Only)
1.
Do you think homosexual relations between consenting adults should or
should not be legal? [6/17-20/77]
2.

Do you favor the death penalty for those convicted o f murder?[6-7/82]

3.
It has been suggested that the federal government should provide a fixed
amount o f money for the election campaigns o f candidates for the presidency and for
Congress, and that all private contributions from other sources should be prohibited. Do
you think this is a good idea or a poor idea? [9/7-10/73]
4.(5) Are you in favor o f the death penalty for those convicted o f murder? [4/912/76]
5.(6) Do you think that homosexuals should or should not be hired for
elementary school teaching? [6/17-6/20/77]
6.(7) Are you in favor o f the death penalty for persons convicted o f rape? [3/36/78]
7.(8) Do you favor or oppose making birth control available to teenage boys and
girls? [12/9-12/77]
8.(13) Do you favor or oppose police stopping motorists at random to give them
a test such as a breath alcohol or coordination test, even though they may not have
committed an offense? [6/17-20/77]
9.(21) Do you favor or oppose the registration o f the names o f all young men so
that in the event o f an emergency the time needed to call up men for a draft would be
reduced? [7/11-7/80]
10(22) If a draft were to become necessary, should young women be required to
participate as well as young men? [3/1-5/79]
11(23) Do you think that homosexuals should or should not be hired for the armed
forces? [6/25-28/82]
12(24) Do you favor or oppose a law in this state that would prohibit tandemtruck rigs on major interstate highways? [4/29-5/2/83]
13(27) Some communities have passed laws banning the sale and possession of
handguns. Would you favor or oppose having such a law in this city/community? [5/135/16/83]
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14(28) Would you favor or oppose a law that would require all new cars to be
equipped with seat belts that, without any action on the part o f the driver, would lock
automatically in place when the doors are closed? [5/18-21/84]
15(30) Do you feel that high-school students who participate in sports and
extracurricular activities should or should not be required to maintain a minimum grade
point average and school attendance record? [5/17-26/85]
HARRIS (Burger Court Cases Only)
1.(4) Do you favor or oppose a law that requires every person who contributes
$100 or more to be identified by name, address and occupation? [9/73] t
2.(9) The United States government recently decided to allow the supersonic
Concorde to land in the United States for a 16-month trail period. Which statement best
describes how you feel about this decision? [10/8-16/77]
3.(11) Should search warrants authorizing police to search newspaper offices be
issued by judges, or not? [4/6-9/79]
4.(12) All in all, from what you've read or heard, do you agreawith the decision
o f the Supreme Court in the Bakke case? [10/78]
5.(15) Should we continue our diplomatic recognition o f Taiwan, or should we
withdraw that recognition in order to have better relation with communist China? [1/58/79]
6.(16) Do you favor or oppose the ban by the FDA o f the use o f laetrile?
[6/27/77]
7.(17) Should the following rights ever be suspended? The right not to have
one's phone conversations tapped for any reason, except with a court order. [9/5/74]
8.(19) All in all, do you favor or oppose Affirmative Action programs in industry
provided there are not rigid quotas? [11/80]
9.(26) Do you favor or oppose the federal government giving tax exemptions to
schools that segregate whites and blacks? [2/12-2/17/82]
NBC/AP (Burger Court cases only)
1.(10) Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "There should be
laws against the distribution o f pornography, even to adults." [2/81]
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2.(15) Do you approve or disapprove of laws that allow someone to be found not
guilty o f a crime because o f insanity? [6/22/82]
3.(25) Do you think school boards should be able to ban controversial books from
public school libraries and classes, or should school librarians and teachers have the final
say about what books are available? [10/25-26/81]
4.(29) The law now says that judges must throw out evidence which police obtain
illegally. Would you favor a change so that more o f this evidence can be admitted, or do
you think the law should be kept as it is? [1/18-19/85]
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